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THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE STANDING
AND THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF INTERVENTION
Statutes creating most federal regulatory agencies1 provide for interven-
tion to assist in determining the public interest by persons likely to be af-
fected by the results of a proceeding. In an effort to balance the need for
representation of the general public against inherent limitations on agencies'
capacity to hear and consider argument, the courts have developed rules
defining the kind of interest a person must possess to be entitled to stand-
ing to intervene. Until recently, the right to participate in broadcast license
application case§ was afforded to parties only if the injury they asserted fit
within one of two categories: economic harm or electrical interference.
These standing rules have been gradually liberalized by granting standing
to parties asserting progressively more tenuous claims of economic harm or
electrical interference. Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC,2 a 1966 decision, allowed television viewers, who
suffered no injury cognizable within the two previously accepted cate-
gories, to challenge the renewal of a television station's license. The court
recognized that liberalization of the standing requirements within those
categories had not achieved the desired result of litigating the public interest.
In response to this problem the court recognized a public right of inter-
vention.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF STANDING
The watershed case in the development of the law of administrative
standing is the 1940 decision in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station.'
Prior to Sanders, the general rule was that one was entitled to challenge
administrative action only if he was protecting a legal right.4 Although the
1. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 80, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
77i(a) (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 5, 49 Stat.
834-35, 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1964); Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 19(b), 52 Stat. 831
(1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1964); Federal Power Act, ch. 687, §
313(b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964); Communica-
tions Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(b) (2), 49 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §
402(b) (2) (1964); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(a), 72 Stat. 795, as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964).
2. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
3. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Landmark decisions on administrative standing seem to have
a habit of originating with FCC proceedings, perhaps simply by chance.
4. See 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.04 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATrIv ACTION 505-14 (1965); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 HAIv. L. Rav. 255, 261-71 (1961); Comment, Standing of
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legal right concept is circular-since a party has standing only if his in-
terest is legally protected and his interest is legally protected only if he is
afforded standing-it is the usual test for allowing or denying intervention.'
In Sanders a competitor of the proposed licensee was allowed to appeal
from the decision of the Federal Communications Commission because
of the economic injury he might suffer as a consequence of the grant of
the license, even though no legal right was involved.' The Supreme Court
emphasized that the economic injury Sanders was likely to suffer was not
itself a relevant issue before the Commission. It was relevant only in that
it afforded Sanders standing for the purpose of litigating the public interest.'
Three years later the FCC v. NBC (KOA)8 case, with some assistance
from the earlier Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC9 case, added the electrical
interference corollary to the Sanders doctrine. The KOA case holds that if a
proposed licensee's station would cause electrical interference with an exist-
ing station's signal to the point of modifying its license, the existing station
is entitled to participate in the hearing and to appeal.'" Unlike Sanders
no direct allegation of economic harm was made by, or required of, the
Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 CoLum.
L. REv. 1511, 1511-12 (1966). The concept of legal right emerging from Supreme Court
decisions on standing appears to be a confused one. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE
LAW § 22.04 (1958). In general, it probably means that one has standing to enforce a
statute designed to protect his interests or to enforce a common law right. See Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1937); The Chicago Junction Case, 264
U.S. 258 (1924); 3 K. DAVIs supra; L. JAFFE, supra.
Prior to 1939 the Federal Communications Commission was an exception to the legal
right rule. Until that date the regulations on intervention were so lax that almost any-
one could and did intervene, so that the efficiency of the agency was threatened and the
regulations were changed. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.152 (1938). See also 49 COLUM. L. Rv.
579, 581 (1949).
5. 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 4, at § 22.04.
6. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940); see Davis,
Standing in Administrative Law, 49 COLUM. L. Rnv. 759, 778 (1949); Note, Competi-
tors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
843, 845 (1956).
7. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940).
8. 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
9. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
10. FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
11. In the KOA case the Supreme Court stated:
Here KOA, while not alleging economic injury, does allege that its license
ought not to be modified because such action would cause electrical interference
which would be detrimental to the public interest. FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S.
239, 247 (1943).
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intervenors." But, as in Sanders, the intervenors were granted standing to
litigate the public interest because of the possibility of private injury. "
Standing to appeal agency decisions under the Sanders doctrine was
reconciled with the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy
13
by Judge Frank in Associated Indus. v. Ickes.'4 Judge Frank argued that
the case or controversy requirement is met when an officer such as the
Attorney General challenges the constitutional or statutory authority of an
agency's action. Thus, if a citizen is considered as a "private Attorney
General" to challenge agency actions, the case or controversy requirement
is met, even though the citizen was not litigating a legally protected right
of his own.
The Sanders doctrine, as explained and refined by subsequent case law,
had become applicable to the entire field of administrative law. Its ex-
pansion was predictable, since many regulatory agencies had similar sta-
tutory language in their standing requirements."
A. Economic Injury Cases
The early cases applying Sanders limited the doctrine by holding that
one had to prove direct economic injury to satisfy the standing require-
ments.1" A trilogy of early FCC cases,1 and several comparatively recent
ones,"8 indicate that there may still be a minimal requirement that the
12. Id.; Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
15. Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The Private
Action Goes Public, 66 COLUM. L. Ray. 1511, 1513 (1966).
16. American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 155 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1946); United States
Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943).
17. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d
486 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
18. Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 280 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Big River);
Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 267 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Southwestern
Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Interstate (Big River)
case was argued both on economic injury and electrical interference. The case is but one
in a series. Interstate was allowed to intervene in two other hearings. Interstate Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Patchogue); Interstate Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Grossco). In the Patchogue
case the court explained that the cumulative effect of numerous small incursions upon
Interstate's service area did give it standing, even though the first incursion, the Big
River case, did not meet the statutory "party in interest" test. In the Red River case
only about 200 persons were likely to be in the overlap area, and this was inadequate
electrical interference to qualify as a party in interest.
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economic injury or electrical interference be significant. Recent decisions, 9
allowing intervention upon a showing of remote and indirect economic
injury, indicate that the general trend is toward liberalization of the eco-
nomic injury test, and that restrictive use of the test will only be made to
prevent parties having no real interest in a proceeding from intervening
and thereby reducing administrative efficiency.
Decisions from several other agencies demonstrate the relaxation of the
economic injury test.2" For example, coal mine owners and unions rep-
19. Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Grossco); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Patchogue); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Metropolitan Tele-
vision Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Camden Radio v. FCC, 220
F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Jaffe, supra note 4, at 274-75; Comment, Standing
of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66
COLUM. L. Rzv. 1511, 1513-14 (1966); Note, Intervention by Third Parties in Federal
Administrative Proceedings, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 71, 78 (1966); 52 VA. L. REv. 1360,
1362 (1966). An example of this relaxation is the series of Interstate cases, analyzed in
note 18, supra.
20. California v. FPC, 353 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 351
F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1965); see Lynchburg Gas Co. v. FPC, 336 F.2d, 942 (D.C. Cir.
1964); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Seaboard & W. Air-
lines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); Sea-
train Lines v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 619 (D. Del.), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 181
(1957). The Sunray case is, perhaps, the farthest any court has been willing to go in
relaxing the standing requirements. The court admitted that it was not sure that Sunray
would be able to demonstrate economic harm resulting from an FPC order; but, since
the FPC had refused to afford Sunray a hearing on that issue, standing was accorded.
Some writers have distinguished intervenors who are competitors from those who are
not competitors. Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The
Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1511, 1513-15 (1966). Whatever value
there may be to this analysis, the result seems to be the same in both cases; a continual
process of liberalization of the standing rules. The leading competitive injury cases are
as follows: Railway Express Agency v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1957); City of
Pittsburgh v. FPC, supra (competing barge owner given standing); National Coal Ass'n
v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1951); Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, supra; Land
O'Lakes Creameries v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943); Seatrain Lines v. United
States, supra; Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 330 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dic-
tum); National Capital Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 148 F. Supp. 317 (D.D.C. 1957);
Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 473 (D. Ore. 1955); Ameri-
can President Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953); Com-
ment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes
Public, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1511, 1513-15 (1966); Note, Intervention by Third Parties
in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 71, 78-79 (1966). The
National Coal Association case is the leading case in this area.
The leading non-competitive injury cases are as follows: National Motor Freight
As'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963); Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1946);
California v. FPC, supra (state allowed to intervene as a consumer); Lynchburg Gas Co.
v. FPC, supra; Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir.
1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/6
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resenting the mine and railway workers successfully intervened to challenge
a Federal Power Commission order allowing construction of a natural gas
pipeline." The coal mine operators were indirect competitors of the na-
tural gas company. Because they could have suffered some economic harm
they were allowed to intervene. Since unions are affected by competition
to their industry, they too were accorded standing.
The leading case illustrating relaxation of the economic injury require-
ment is Philco Corp. v. FCC.2 Philco was allowed to intervene to oppose
renewal of NBC's license to operate its Philadelphia television station de-
spite the fact that Philco was not at that time in the broadcasting business.
The basis of Philco's petition to intervene was that NBC was a subsidiary
of RCA, a rival manufacturer, and that RCA was gaining a "preferential
economic advantage in advertising" from NBC's operation of the station.
While Philco's allegations demonstrated only indirect and speculative eco-
nomic harm, standing was afforded.2"
A related liberalization of the standing requirements was the develop-
ment of the rule that a party need not make an evidentiary showing of
economic harm or electrical interference to be allowed to intervene. A
series of decisions from various agencies hold that a would-be intervenor
need only allege facts sufficient to indicate that he would suffer economic
injury and that the grant of the proposed license would not be in the public
interest.24 Further, it is clear, at least in FCC proceedings, that a party
Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, supra (city afforded
standing as a customer); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture,
120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941); Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest
FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUm L. Ray. 1511, 1515 (1966).
The Associated Industries case is the "seminal decision in this vein." Id.
21. National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
22. 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
23. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For an interesting discus-
sion of the Philco case see Jaffe, supra note 4, at 275-85. Professor Jaffe is somewhat
critical of the Philco case and finds the dissent by Judge Madden convincing, but seems
to conclude that there are instances in which it is desirable to allow "public action."
With this part of the Philco decision he would seem to agree. See also 35 GEo. WASH.
L. R v. 393, 394-95 (1966).
24. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 351 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1965); Interstate Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Grossco); Interstate
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Patchogue); Philco Corp. v.
FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221
F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Camden Radio v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(dictum); see Seatrain Lines v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 619 (D. Del. 1957), afJ'd
per curiam, 355 U.S. 181 (1958).
However, failure to assert a public interest argument at the proper time may bar a party
from asserting it at a later time. American Fed'n of Musicians v. FCC, 356 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Valley Telecasting Co. v. FCC, 338 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
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who satisfies the standing requirements must be allowed to intervene as a
matter of right rather than at the discretion of the agency.25
Having liberalized the requirements for intervention, the federal courts
were faced with the problem of determining the degree of participation to
be given an intervenor in an FCC proceeding. Early in the development
of the standing rules, the Supreme Court in KOA held that an intervenor
alleging a "license modification" through electrical interference must be
given full rights of intervention." Over a decade later the Supreme Court
held that an intervenor alleging economic injury must be given a full
hearing' and defined a full hearing as including the right to present oral,
documentary or rebuttal evidence and the right to cross-examination.2 8
Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1939). These cases hold that failure to assert
an issue at an earlier time is fatal, even though the issue would normally satisfy the
standing requirements. The Valley case holds that the proper time to challenge the grant
of a license because of economic injury is at the time of the initial grant; if not presented
at that time it is waived in the absence of "very unusual circumstances." Valley Tele-
casting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 279. An example of such "very unusual circumstances" is
found in an earlier FCC case in which Radio Station WOW did not oppose the initial
grant of a license to Star Broadcasting Co. because it was assumed that Star's engineer's
report was accurate and no objectionable interference would result from the granting of
a license to Star. With the operation of the new station it was discovered that the report
was in error and objectionable interference did result. The federal court allowed WOW
to intervene at the renewal hearing to raise the electrical interference issue stating:
An error in good faith as to a proposed operation seems to us to leave that particu-
lar matter open for determination upon application for renewal. We repeat, for
emphasis, that it is the statutory requirement as to renewal which reopens matters
as to which bona fide error was originally made.
We do not mean to intimate that an application for renewal reopens all the
questions which were considered upon the original application.
Radio Station WOW v. FCC, 184 F.2d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
25. Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir.
1956). The Commission argued that even though a party satisfies the standing require-
ments, the Commission had the discretion to deny a party the right of intervention. The
only appealable question would then be whether or not the Commission had abused its
discretion by capricious and arbitrary action. It is clear that had the Commission pre-
vailed in this argument, few unsuccessful intervenors would have successfully challenged
the Commission's decision on appeal. However, the court ruled that under § 309 of the
Communications Act a party who satisfies the standing requirements must be allowed to
intervene as a matter of right.
26. FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); accord, L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC,
170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Davis, supra note 6, at 770. But cf. Gerico Inv. Co. v.
FCC, 255 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also NBC v. FCC, 362 F.2d 946, 954-55
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
27. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); accord, Inter-
state Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Philco Corp. v. FCC,
293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 265
F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But see NBC
v. FCC, 362 F.2d 946, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (had in fact received a full hearing
even though FCC denied right of intervention).
28. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). Under present
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While the federal courts have relaxed the economic injury requirements,
the requirement that an intervenor offer to litigate the public interest re-
mains,29 though it may be no more than a pleading requirement.30 Indeed,
the desire to secure litigation of the public interest may have occasioned
the relaxation of the standing rules."1 Unfortunately, there is evidence that
private parties who have been allowed to intervene have not litigated the
public interest. 2
B. Non-Economic Injury Cases
Prior to United Church of Christ, standing was rarely afforded a party
suffering a non-economic injury to challenge an agency's actions. Indeed,
the cases in which standing was afforded can usually be explained on a
theory other than a recognition of a public right of intervention.
Two commonly cited non-economic injury cases involved transit riders."
rules, the Commission is required to file a statement of reasons for granting the license or
renewal if a "petition to deny" has been filed by an intervenor who has standing as a
"party in interest" within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 309d(1) (1964) and 47 C.F.R. §
1.580(i) (1966). 47 U.S.C. § 309d(2) (1964); 47 C.F.R. § 1.591(c) (1966). A hearing
on the petition is required only if the Commission is unable to determine whether grant-
ing the license would be in the public interest or a hearing is necessary to resolve a sub-
stantial question of fact. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309e (Supp. 1966); 47 C.F.R. § 1.593 (1966).
Parties who are not afforded standing must be content to file "informal objections" under
47 C.F.R. § 1.587 (1966), and no statement of findings is required. Thus, there may be
no record of the Commission's action on informal objections, precluding judicial review.
29. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Yankee Network v. FCC,
107 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1939). The Federal Communications Act requires "specific
allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a
grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with subsection (a) of this
section."- 47 U.S.C. § 309d(1) (1964); 47 C.F.R. § 1.580(i) (1966). Subsection (a) sets
forth the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard for issuance of licenses.
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964). The latter requirement of subsection (d) recognizes what
the federal courts have continually stressed-that parties are allowed to intervene
only because they raise questions relevant to the public interest. This thought was
recently re-emphasized in the United Church of Christ case:
It is important to remember that the cases allowing standing to those falling
within either of the two established categories [Sanders' economic test and KOA's
electrical interference test] have emphasized that standing is accorded to persons
not for the protection of their private interest but only to vindicate the public
interest.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1001
(1966).
30. Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
31. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 283-85.
32. See Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 780 (1965); National Broad-
casting Co., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964); Key Br6adcasting Systems, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 1 (1957).
See generally notes 67-79 infra, and accompanying text.
33. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Pollak v. Public Util.
Com'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir.), reu'd on "other grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1951).
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In one, riders were allowed to challenge an agency order permitting radio
loudspeakers in public buses.3 4 In the other, Negro transit riders were
allowed to challenge allegedly discriminatory ICC transportation prac-
tices.3" In both it appears that standing was afforded because the parties
were protecting legal rights, thus satisfying traditional standing require-
ments. 6
In United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC,3" the Secretary of the Interior
was allowed to challenge a ruling of the Federal Power Commission grant-
ing a license to construct a hydroelectric facility to a private company.
Clearly, the Secretary was not asserting a private economic injury as the
basis for standing. Since the Supreme Court opinion limits the case to its
facts,3" the case is of little value as precedent for a public right of interven-
tion.
Of the remaining cases normally grouped as involving non-economic
injury, most could be said to involve some economic interest." However,
one recent case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,40 seemed
to recognize a public right of intervention. In that case a group of private
citizens was opposed to the Hudson River Storm King project of the Fed-
eral Power Commission because of its effect on the recreational, aesthetic,
and conservational aspects of the area. The FPC recognized that it func-
tioned "to protect non-economic as well as economic interests"41 and af-
34. Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
343 U.S. 451 (1951).
35. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
36. Id.; Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir.); rev'd on other
grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1951).
37. 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
38. The Supreme Court stated:
We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude
a single opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarifica-
tion of this complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose
problems is in any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of
individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support of standing in
these cases.
United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). But cf. Johnson v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 188 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1951), denying standing be-
fore the ICC to a ferry boat owner and a dentist to review the abandoning of railway
service between two cites in Virginia. The Virginia State Corporation Commission had
issued the order without the approval of the ICC, and the petitioners sought to show
that the Commission had acted without authority.
39. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947) (tenant whose rent is fixed by law);
Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (city allowed to challenge agency
order affecting its air service); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (con-
sumers allowed to challenge an agency order allowing oleomargarine manufacturers to
use synthetic vitamins without stating same on the label).
40. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966Y.
41. Id. at 615.
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forded the group standing. While some potential economic harm was
found to exist,"2 the economic basis is so weak as to justify describing the
case as a clear departure from traditional theory and a forerunner of United
Church of Christ.
II. TH. PUBLIc RIGHT OF INTERVENTION
In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC"
various private organizations and citizens sought to intervene as represent-
atives of the public interest to object to the renewal of a television broad-
cast license. The would-be intervenors alleged that the station practiced
racial and religious bias in programming and was guilty of excessive use
of commercials."' The FCC refused to grant the parties standing, but
considered their arguments without a formal hearing.45 As a result the
station was granted only a one-year conditional license rather than the
normal three-year license." The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the FCC, holding that the appellants, as representatives
of the public interest, were proper parties to intervene at a renewal hear-
ing47 and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. " The Court rec-
ognized that in prior FCC cases standing had been accorded to parties
qualifying under one of the two traditional categories: economic harm or
electrical interference. However, the court reasoned that these categories
were not the "exclusive grounds for standing."4" Finding no Congressional
intent to lmit standing to these two classifications, 0 the court concluded
from the rationale of Sanders, KOA, and the non-economic injury cases of
42. Id. at 616.
43. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 997-99.
45. Id. at 1005.
46. The license was renewed on the following conditions:
(i) That the licensee comply strictly with the established requirements of the
fairness doctrine ...
(ii) For the same reasons, that the licensee observe strictly its representations
to the Commission in this area-namely, that as to the programs originating lo-
cally, it will at all times provide each side in any controversial issue with time....
(iii) That, in the light of the substantial questions raised by the United Church
petition, the licensee immediately have discussions with community leaders, includ-
ing those active in the civil rights movement (such as petitioners), as to whether
its programing [sic] is fully meeting the needs and interests of its area....
(iv) That the licensee immediately cease discriminatory programing (sic) pat-
terns. . ...
Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1154-55 (1965).
47. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 1006-07.
49. Id. at 1001.
50. Id. at 1001-02.
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other agencies that representatives of an appreciable segment of the view-
ing or listening public have standing to litigate the public interest at a
license renewal hearing. 1
While the Sanders, KOA, and non-economic injury cases lend support
to the conclusion reached in United Church of Christ, it is important to
recognize that this decision for the first time states a new doctrine: The
right of intervention which has been a right vested in competitors and major
consumers, is now also vested in representative groups of the general
public.2
A. Effect on the FCC
The holding of the United Church of Christ case was limited by the court
to license renewal hearings. 3 However, the opinion does not expressly
preclude expansion of the right of public intervention to initial license ap-
plication hearings. But at present all problems arising from initial license
application proceedings are unaffected by the right. 4
1. Administrative Efficency
In opposing the motion for intervention, the FCC argued that the effici-
ency of its operation would be seriously endangered if its hearings were
opened to parties such as the appellants.55 For a number of reasons, this
fear does not seem well-founded. The FCC has always had the power
to dismiss a petition for intervention if, assuming all the would-be inter-
51. Id. at 1005.
52. See Smith & Soloman Trucking Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 243, 253 (D.
N.J. 1966).
53. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005 (1966).
54. The FCC has suffered great criticism for its alleged abuse of discretion in award-
ing licenses for new stations. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 881 (1962); LANDIS, REPORT
ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESMENT-ELECT, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1960);
cf. Elias, Administrative Discretion-No Solution in Sight, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 313, 314
(Winter 1961-62).
55. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
56. This conclusion seems to be shared by the other writers who have considered the
United Church of Christ case. Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest
FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1511, 1527 (1966);
Note, Intervention by Third Parties in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 42 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 71, 82 (1966); 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 393, 397 (1966); 80 HARv. L.
REv. 670, 673 (1967) ;44 TExAs L. REv. 1605, 1609-10 (1966); 52 VA. L. REv. 1360,
1366 (1966).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
venor's allegations to be true, the license should still be issued."' More im-
portantly, the United Church of Christ decision provides the FCC with
broad discretion to control intervention. First, a proposed intervenor must
demonstrate that he represents an appreciable segment of the public to be
affected by the order. 8 Further, if more than one party seeks to intervene,
as in United Church of Christ, the FCC may select one to champion the
public interest.5 " An application of United Church of Christ in a Civil
Aeronautics Board proceeding has been to deny intervention to a party
when other intervenors have raised substantially the same issues in the same
proceeding."0 Finally, the cost involved in intervening at a license renewal
hearing will no doubt reduce participation by those not seriously committed
to litigating on behalf of the public interest."'
2. Issues Relevant to the Public Interest
A question equally as basic as the question of who has standing is, what
issues are relevant? In United Church of Christ the issues the intervenors
sought to raise-the licensee's practice of racial and religious bias in pro-
gramming and excessive use of commercials--were clearly relevant to the
FCC's deliberations.
In United Church of Christ the court seemed to find the need for im-
proving the quality of television, a point not urged by the intervenors, to
be a persuasive argument for a public right of intervention.62 With respect
57. Since the Commission has failed to define standards determining the scope of the
public interest, it may be difficult for the Commission to be sure an issue is truly irrele-
vant. See 52 VA. L. Rv. 1360, 1366-67 (1966).
58. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
59. Id. This would seem to be an area where the court will permit the FCC wide
latitude in the use of its discretion. Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest
FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUas. L. Rav. 1511, 1524-27
(1966); 44 TExAs L. Rnv. 1605, 1610 (1966). However, there is evidence that the FCC
is having some difficulty in determining which parties asserting the public interest should
be allowed to intervene. 80 HARv. L. Rav. 670, 673 (1967).
60. See City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d. 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
61. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 393, 397 (1966). See generally
Note, Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104
U. PA. L. Rzv. 843, 862, (1956); Note, Standing to Protest Before the FCC, 55 COLUDI.
L. REv. 209, 224 (1955).
62. It may be that the court is merely talking about regulating to achieve balanced
broadcasting that serves the needs of the community rather than quality control. How-
ever, language such as "the potential contribution of widespread public interest and
participation in improving the quality of broadcasting," indicates that regulations of
quality is what the court intended. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Further, other writers have been of the
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to this problem, the relevancy requirement seems to limit the utility of the
public right of intervention. Though the Commission can and does regulate
the allotment of time to particular types of programming,63 the Commission
has consistently taken the position that it has no power to regulate pro-
gram content to achieve quality television."
License renewal cases support the Commission's position. Very few
licenses have ever been denied or refused because of objectionable broad-
casting."5 Of those that have, all but one involved obscene and slanderous
language rather than the general level of program content.6 The one mav-
erick case 7 involved an application for an increase in signal strength by two
rival stations. Because one station admitted accepting all network pro-
grams, while the other station was more selective in presenting them, the
latter station was successful. The utility of this decision as precedent for
opinion that the court was concerned with regulation of quality. Comment, Standing of
Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 1511, 1522 (1966); 52 VA. L. REv. 1360, 1365 (1966); see 35 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 393, 395 (1966).
63. Friendly, supra note 54, at 1059; Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing
Applicants, 43 MINN. L. Rav. 479, 487 (1959); 2 VAND. L. REV. 464, 466 n.10 (1949).
64. Loevinger, The Issues in Program Regulation, 20 FED. CoMm. B.J. 3 (1966).
Three explanations are offered to support this conclusion:
(1) The First Amendment prohibits such action. Loevinger, supra, at 15.
(2) Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1091, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964)) prohibits such action.
(3) This is not a proper function of the FCC. Loevinger, supra at 15; Pierson,
The Need for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. CoMm. B.J. 15 (1963).
Pierson wishes to change section 326 so as to leave no doubt that it prohibits quality
regulation. This suggestion may well be an attempt to minimize the effect of certain cases
upholding FCC actions which, arguably, are attempts at quality control. See, e.g., Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
951 (1963).
65. The following cases are the only ones in which objectionable broadcasting was the
basis of FCC action in denying an application for renewal of a license or modification of
a license. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964);
Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1948);
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broad-
casting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
66. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964);
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broad-
casting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). The latter two cases clearly
involve slanderous or abusive language and false advertising rather than censorship.
Segal, Recent Trends in Censorship of Radiobroadcast Programs, 20 RocKY MT. L. RyV.
366 (1948). The Robinson case involves a slightly different twist. Robinson employed
an announcer who persisted in the use of coarse, vulgar and suggestive language. Robin-
son, in attempting to obtain a renewal of his license, told the Commission he had been
shocked to discover these facts and had fired the announcer. It became clear that Rob-
inson had known very well what had been going on and had wilfully deceived the Com-
mission. His application for renewal was denied because of his lack of character.
67. Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1948).
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program content control is questionable, even coupled with the United
Church of Christ decision, and the relevancy requirement seems to pre-
clude use of the public right of intervention to litigate program content.
3. Insuring Litigation of the Public Interest
The primary reason for creating a public right of intervention was the
fear that this was the only means by which the public interest would be
adequately litigated."s Competitors who have been granted standing do in
fact limit their efforts to the litigation of their own private interests rather
than the public interest. " The FCC has been unable or unwilling to liti-
gate the public interest adequately on its own." The result is that the
public interest, despite the statutory commandment, 1 has not been exten-
sively litigated."2 The response of the federal courts is the creation of a
public right of intervention."
The history of standing before the FCC prior to United Church of Christ
provides strong support for the conclusion that a public right of interven-
tion is necessary. 4 The most striking demonstration of a need for a public
68. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003-4 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69. See Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 780 (1965); National Broad-
casting Co., Inc., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964); Key Broadcasting System, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 1
(1957).
70. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC
Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 CoLUm. L. Rlv. 1511, 1521-23 (1966); see
Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 780 (1965).
71. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 309(a), 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964).
72. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC
Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1511, 1521-22 (1966); 35
GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 393, 397 (1966); 80 HAav. L. Rnv. 670, 672-73 (1967);
see notes 68-69 supra.
73. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
74. In Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955), for exam-
ple, a local newspaper was granted standing as a competitor who would suffer economic
injury by the grant of a station license. The newspaper alleged that one of the two rival
applicants for the license had withdrawn from the hearing after receiving $14,390 as
compensation for "out-of-pocket" expenses from the other applicant. The newspaper
contended that there should have been a thorough investigation to determine that the
money was in fact no more than compensation for the expenses incurred by the applicant
in pursuing its application. The court agreed and remanded the case. At the remand
hearing, the newspaper requested and was allowed to withdraw because it was satisfied
that the transactions of the applicants were in the public interest. Upon the newspaper's
withdrawal the original grant was affirmed without a finding on the issue of the re-
imbursements. Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 22 F.C.C. 745 (1957).
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right of intervention is KGMO Radio-Television, Inc. v. FCC."5 KGMO
sought to intervene to oppose the grant of a construction permit for a com-
peting station because of the economic injury it would suffer and because
there was insufficient talent in the area to support two stations. The FCC
denied the petition because the issues were too broadly framed, but the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand the Commission
consolidated for a single hearing the application for the new license with
KGMO's application for renewal."' Apparently sensing something re-
sembling a comparative hearing at which only one party might prevail,
both KGMO and the applicant requested that KGMO's petition for in-
tervention be dismissed and both licenses be issued. The Commission
acquiesced. 7  Commissioner Cox, in the course of his dissent, observed:
KGMO felt strongly enough about its claim to appeal the Commis-
sion's initial dismissal of its petition for reconsideration. Upon remand
of the case by the Court, petitioner further supplemented its claims.
Thereafter both the application for KZYM for a new station and the
pending renewal application of KGMO were designated for hearing in
a consolidated proceeding. Suddenly both parties agreed that further
prosecution of the proceedings would entail excessive expense, and
jointly petitioned the Commission, in effect, to forget the whole ques-
tion of possible detriment to the public interest, and authorize both
stations to operate."8
The conclusion suggested above is inescapable: private parties are con-
cerned solely with their private interests, and the Commission, at least in
some cases, cannot or will not adequately consider the public interest on
its own.'
75. 336 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
76. Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., I F.C.C.2d 780 (1965).
77. Id. at 780-81.
78. Id. at 781 (footnotes omitted). In the Clarksburg case the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had held that the Commission must find that issuing a license serves
the public interest, even if the granting or renewing of a license is unopposed. Clarks-
burg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Apparently the Com-
mission does not believe this means that a hearing must be held. Perhaps, given the
Commission's work load, this makes sense as a general rule. However, in a case such as
this one a full hearing seems in order. Commissioner Cox argued:
It was only when their [KGMO's] renewal was placed in issue in the event of a
finding that the area would not support a new station that the matter of expense
was mentioned. I don't think parties should be permitted to make such abrupt
changes in their representations to the Commission without a complete showing of
reasons therefor, nor should the Commission gloss over public interest issues it has
set for hearing simply because the private party who raised them initially has sud-
denly lost interest in the matter for reasons solely related to his own private inter-
ests.
Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 780, 782 (1965).
79. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Although the public right of intervention as announced in United Church
of Christ applies only to renewal hearings, cases such as KGMO involving
an initial license application present occasions for extension of the doctrine."
Certainly the logic of the United Church of Christ decision would seem to
be consistent with such an extension.
4. Controlling Administrative Discretion
The decision in United Church of Christ illustrates an important and
little-recognized function of the standing law as a vehicle by which
the courts indicate to regulatory agencies what issues the courts consider
relevant to a determination of the public interest.81 A decision that a party
has standing usually implies that the issues he seeks to raise are relevant for
agency consideration, and some cases expressly state that certain issues are
relevant.82
In order to appreciate the significance of this function of the standing
cases, one must remember that the legislative body may delegate power to
an administrative agency without definite standards for the use of that
power.8 The Congressional theory, in delegating power to regulatory
agencies without definite standards, was that such agencies could better
80. The Clarksburg Publishing Co. case involved an initial license application, and,
like KGMO, would seem to suggest an expansion of the United Church of Christ doctrine.
See note 73 supra.
81. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMiINISTRATIVE ACTION 505 (1965); 35
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 393, 395 (1966); 44 Taxms L. REv. 1605, 1610 (1966). The stand-
ing rules are not the only procedural device used by federal courts to control tho exer-
cise of the Commission's discretion in determining the public interest. Other procedural
rules, such as the following have been so utilized. All decisions must be based on a find-
ing of fact. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 613 (1938). For an interesting and critical analysis of the Saginaw case see Timberg,
Administrative Findings of Fact, 27 WAsHr. U.L.Q. 169 (1942). A comparative hearing
must be held when there are two mutually exclusive applicants before a license can be
issued. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); see Capitol Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The rule has even been extended, in a
modified form, to cover temporary license grants. Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960). A Commissioner cannot cast the deciding vote when
he has not heard the oral arguments in the proceeding. WIBC, Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 920 (1958). Neither can the verification require-
ment on an application for a license be waived. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
82. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Philco Corp. v. FCC,
257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Carroll Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hall v. FCC, 257 F.2d 626 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Camden Radio v. FCC, 220
F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
83. Elias, supra note 54, at 316.
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develop their own standards-flexible enough to allow for proper exercise
of administrative discretion but definite enough to allow for predictability
of agency decisions."' The Federal Communications Act is a good example
of such a delegation of power. The sole criterion for granting or renewing
a broadcast license is the "public interest, convenience, and necessity.""9
Unfortunately, the record of the FCC has not vindicated the Congressional
theory.8" Rather, the FCC has failed to provide meaningful standards,87
has been subject to objectionable ex parte communications,88 and has been
charged with being subject to network domination. 9
Faced with failure of the FCC to delineate viable standards," the federal
courts seem to have turned to standing doctrine as a means of instruct-
ing the FCC as to what issues are relevant to its consideration. One
example of such action is Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.91 The FCC
had not interpreted the Sanders decision as holding that economic injury
to a competitor of a proposed licensee is relevant to a determination of the
public interest. 2 In the Carroll case by according standing to a competitor
who had unsuccessfully sought to raise the economic harm issue at a license
application hearing, the court instructed the FCC that such an issue is
relevant when it is alleged to have an adverse affect on the public interest
and must be considered in awarding a license.93
The most encouraging aspect of this use of standing doctrine is that
the FCC, at least on occasion, on the remand of the case gives full con-
84. Note, The Function of the Supreme Court in the Development and Acquisition
of Powers by Administrative Agencies, 42 MINN. L. REV. 271 (1957).
85. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 309(a), 48 Stat. 1085, as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964).
86. Friendly, supra note 54, at 1055-72.
87. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85th CONG., 2D
SESS., STUDY ON REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 154 (SuBcoIMM. PRINT 1958). Friendly,
supra note 54; LANDIS, supra note 54; cf. Elias, supra note 54; MacDonald, The Need
for Standards in Selection of Licensees, 17 AD. L. Rav. 61, 68-69 (1964).
88. Jacksonville Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 348 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 893 (1965); Fort Harrison Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 324 F.2d 379 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964); WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 841 (1961); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. FCC
(WHDH), 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1961); LANDIS,
supra note 54; COLON, The Court and the Commissions: Ex Parte Contacts and the
Sangamon Valley Case, 19 FED. COM. B.J. 67 (1964-65).
89. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
946 (1959); LANDIS, supra note 54.
90. Friendly, supra note 54, at 881.
91. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
92. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 434-35 (1959); see West
Georgia Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C. 161, 169 (1959).
93. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sideration to issues raised by the successful intervenor. While it is true that
the large majority of the standing cases remanded to the FCC were simply
affirmed,9" there are notable exceptions to the rule. One such exception is
Hall v. FCC." In that case a competitor of Hall had asked to be allowed
to move its radio station which Hall claimed would cause objectionable
electrical interference. The federal courts remanded the case to the Com-
mission three times for failure to consider the effect of the alleged electrical
interference and the effect of misrepresentations made by the competitor in
its application.9" Eight years after granting the competitor's application, the
FCC concluded it had erred and reversed its former decision."'
The Philco case, discussed previously, also illustrates this little-recognized
function of the standing cases. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
twice and on the second remand explicitly held that Philco's allegations
as to preferential advertising and monopolistic practices were relevant to
NBC's application for renewal of the license for its Philadelphia station.9"
While it appears that these issues did not enter into the Commission's final
disposition of the case, 9 on remand the Commission heard testimony which
caused it to reverse its original grant to NBC. The Commission found that
NBC had used the threat of withdrawing its network affiliation to force
the Westinghouse Company, then the Philadelphia licensee, to trade the
Philadelphia station to NBC in exchange for a station in the smaller Cleve-
94. KGMO Radio-Television, Inc. v. FCC, 336 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1964), original
decision aff'd, Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 780 (1965); Interstate
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963), original decision afl'd,
Berkshire Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 1 (1963) (Grossco); Patchogue Broadcasting
Co., 35 F.C.C. 8 (1963) (Patchogue); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 265
F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1959), original decision aff'd, Western Nebraska Television, Inc.,
24 F.C.C. 513 (1958); Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.
1958), original decision aff'd, West Georgia Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C. 161 (1959);
Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956), original
decision aff'd, Key Broadcasting System, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 1 (1957); Granik v. FCC,
234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956), original decision aff'd, W. Wright Esch, 22 F.C.C. 82
(1957); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955), original
decision aff'd, Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 22 F.C.C. 745 (1957).
Perhaps, from evidence such as this, Professor Elias has reached the conclusion that
judicial relief for a party aggrieved by administrative action is wholly illusory. Elias,
supra note 54. See generally Goldfarb, Administrative Agency Action After Remand, 18
W. REs. L. Rav. 565 (1967).
95. 257 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Greenville Television Co. v. FCC, 221 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
96. See cases cited in note 95 supra.
97. Spartan Radiocasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 765 (1962).
98. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
99. National Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964).
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land market.' 0 This finding precluded a holding that the public interest
would be served by renewal of NBC's license, and the Commission ordered
NBC to return the station to Westinghouse.'
These cases demonstrate the desire on the part of the federal courts to
insure the litigation of the public interest. As noted in previous sections,
however, private parties often are not concerned with litigation of the public
interest and the Commission may well have been justified in viewing their
arguments with suspicion. The federal courts, by providing a public right
of intervention to complement the use of the standing cases to direct the
discretion of the FCC have further indicated their desire that the Com-
mission utilize its broad discretion to serve the public interest.
B. Effect on Other Administrative Agencies
For a number of reasons, it is likely that the public right of intervetion will
be extended to other agencies. The statutory language, "party in interest"
and "persons aggrieved," construed in United Church of Christ is common
or at least comparable to the organic statutes of most regulatory agencies. 2
The application of the Sanders rule to other agencies indicates that inter-
pretation of such commonly-used statutory language can have wide appli-
cation in federal administrative law.'
One of the best indications of the likelihood of the general applicability
of the public right of intervention is the existing case law construing United
Church of Christ. Because the opinion is so recent such case law is neces-
sarily limited. However, all the cases applying United Church of Christ
have been favorable to the public right doctrine. 4 In one case a labor
100. Id. at 445-50.
101. Id.
102. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 80, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77i(a) (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch 687, § 5, 49 Stat.
834-35, 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1964); Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 19(h), 52 Stat. 831
(1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1964); Federal Power Act, ch. 687, §
313(b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964) ; Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 309(d), 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1964).
103. Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders: The
Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1511, 1513 (1966).
Absent a statutory provision similar to that in Sanders, the Sanders rationale has
sometimes been rejected entirely. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HAav. L. Rv. 255, 287 (1961). The leading case is Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), in which a group of private
electrical companies sought to challenge a federally supported power program. The
court refused to accord the companies standing, even though they would suffer adverse
competition, because they were not protecting a "legal right."
104. Juarez Gas Co., S. A. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Inter-
national Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365, 367 (N.D.
Miss. 1966); Smith & Soloman Trucking Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 243, 252-53
(D.N.J. 1966).
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union sought to litigate alleged discriminatory practices of an employer in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' s Though it appears that the
union was neither protecting a legal right nor suffering economic harm,
standing was accorded.'
A further indication of the probable general applicability of the doctrine
is the foundation provided by earlier case law of other agencies. As pre-
viously noted, consumers of a product have been allowed to challenge ad-
ministrative orders affecting that product;0 7 passengers on buses have been
allowed to challenge the use of loud speakers"0 ' and discriminatory prac-
tices;... cities have been allowed to challenge orders affecting their power
supply" or air service;"' and government officials, who must necessarily
litigate the public interest, have been allowed to challenge agency awards. 2
These cases presage a public right of intervention. In particular, the
previously discussed Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference case allowing
intervention to protect "non-economic interests" seems to depart from tra-
ditional analysis." 3
The conclusion reached with respect to FCC proceedings that a public
right of intervention will not decrease administrative efficiency," 4 is applic-
able to all agencies. Indeed, as noted earlier, one application of United
Church of Christ in a Civil Aeronautics Board proceeding has been to
deny intervention to a party when other parties have raised nearly identical
issues before the Board in the same proceeding."'
Finally, the primary argument for a public right of intervention-that
105. International Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365,
367 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
106. Id. at 368. The court's explanation for according the union standing is rem-
iniscent of the Chapman case. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. The court
stated:
At this point in time and in the development of law in this area, this court isbound to say that the plaintiff union is a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of
the statute with which we are concerned.
107. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d. Cir. 1953).
108. Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1951).
109. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
110. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.,
358 U.S. 103 (1958); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
111. City of Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
112. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
113. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
114. See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text. But see Comment, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 670, 673 (1967).
115. City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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without such a right the public interest is often not litigated-applies with
equal force to all regulatory agencies.
CONCLUSION
The public right of intervention is a long-overdue advance in administra-
tive law. Since administrative agencies were originally delegated power to
serve public rather than private interest, the public, through representative
spokesmen, should have the right to participate in administrative proceed-
ings. By recognition of such a right the federal courts have taken an im-
portant step to reconcile the realities of regulatory agencies' operation with
the theoretical standard of service to the public.
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